Search results for: FCRA

According CFPB’s Director, “In April and May, the [CFPB] received approximately 42,400 and 44,100 complaints, respectively—the highest monthly complaint volumes in the Bureau’s history.”  This is something Consumer Privacy World is monitoring closely because an increase in CFPB complaints means lawsuits and statutory changes are not far behind.

Indeed, just this week the U.S. House passed the Protecting Your Credit Score Act of 2020.  This law would require such things as:

  • certain CRAs to develop an online portal page that gives consumer’s free access to his or her credit report with the ability to dispute the report through portal;
  • limited consumer opt-outs to prevent CRAs from selling consumer information;
  • CRAs would have to match all 9 SSN digits, not just 7 of 9;
  • creation of CFPB ombudsperson with specific oversight of CRAs; and
  • creation of a CRA registry.

In short, these changes are aimed at making the crediting reporting process more transparent and accessible for consumers and consumer reporting more accurate.  These changes are on top of the HEROES Act legislation that we already covered related to FDCPA and FCRA.   To date, neither of these bills are law, but the trends cannot be ignored because best case scenario CRAs and furnishers are likely to face compliance changes and worst case scenario CRAs and furnishers will be met with lawsuits and regulatory enforcement actions.  Either way, we will help you navigate these changes and trends here on Consumer Privacy World.  Stay tuned.  Stay engaged.

 

On June 22, 2000, Judge Miranda M. Du of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada granted Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, statutory damages, reasonable costs, and attorney’s fees in the case of  McGuire v. Allegro Acceptance Corp, No. 2:18-cv-01635-MMD-VCF, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109728 (D. Nev. June 22, 2020). McGuire arose from a dispute over inaccuracies in Plaintiff’s Star Loan Management (“SLM”) account on her June 22, 2017 Experian credit report. The report in question contained a recent balance notation of $2,107, which Plaintiff alleged was “inaccurate and misleading” because a recent bankruptcy had discharged the debt. Plaintiff notified Experian of this inaccuracy on September 21, 2017 and although Experian thereafter notified SLM of the dispute, SLM failed to investigate and update the notation. SLM’s failure to act is a violation under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681.

Plaintiff filed her Complaint against SLM on August 29, 2018 and served her Complaint and Summons on SLM on October 22, 2018. On June 14, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of Default and the Clerk entered default against SLM. On June 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed the subject motion. Ultimately, the Court found that the Eitel factors (see Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986)) weighed in Plaintiff’s favor, noting, “SLM has not answered, made an appearance, or otherwise responded … [i]f Plaintiff’s request for default judgment is not granted, Plaintiff will be without other resources for recovery.” Plaintiff’s monetary requests were granted ($1,000 in statutory damages, $525 in reasonable costs, and $2,833.50 in attorneys’ fees) because the FCRA provides for attorney’s fees for statutory violations and allows plaintiffs to recover costs for any successful action to enforce the section for willful violations.

It happens frequently: A plaintiff commences litigation in state court and for various strategic reasons, a defendant decides it would be better off removing the case to federal court.  However, recent case law from the Supreme Court regarding what disputes may be removed resulted in a groundbreaking ruling from the Eleventh Circuit in a FCRA case  finding that third-party counterclaim defendants cannot remove under 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(c)..

The underlying facts in Bowling v. United States Bank Nat’l Ass’n are relatively straightforward.  Case No. 17-11953, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 19435.  In Bowling, a couple purchased a home and to pay for it, obtained a 30 year mortgage.  Id. at *2.  Over several years, the loan servicer of their mortgage was replaced by another company and then replaced again (this happens routinely).  Eventually, the couple stopped making payments, defaulted, and refused to vacate their residence after the home was purchased in a foreclosure sale.

In response, the new purchaser of the home filed a complaint for ejectment in Alabama state court.  The prior homeowners then filed an “answer and counterclaim” against their former loan servicers—three entities in total.  The prior homeowners asserted various state and federal claims against their former loan servicers, including under the FCRA.  The former loan servicers (the third-party counterclaim defendants) then removed the entire case to federal court—a decision that was opposed by the prior homeowner plaintiffs, and ultimately appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.  Id.

Until this time, Eleventh Circuit precedent regarding removal was governed by the Carl Heck case, in which the Court had ruled that third-party claims in a dispute (not only those brought by the original plaintiff) could be removed from state to federal court, under certain circumstances.  The Carl Heck decision, however, preceded the Supreme Court’s ruling in Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743 (2019).  There, the Supreme Court held that the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(a), did not allow a third-party counterclaim defendant to remove a case to federal court.  Id. at 1751.  Among other reasons, this was because Section 1441(a) refers to “civil actions” rather than “claims” (which required, in the mind of the Court, exclusive consideration of the original plaintiff’s complaint rather than any “irrelevant” counterclaims).  Id. at 1762.

Which brings us back to the dispute in Bowling.  There, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that although removal in the litigation would have previously been proper under Carl Heck, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Home Depot abrogated that decision.  Bowling, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 19435, at *20.  This was so even though Home Depot concerned subsection (a) of 28 U.S.C. Section 1441 (removal on the basis of federal court having “original jurisdiction”), while removal in Bowling had been accomplished under subsection (c) (removal on the basis of federal question jurisdiction”).  This was because, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, the reasoning of Home Depot was applicable to both subsections.  2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 19435, at *16.

Several considerations underscored the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling.  First, applying fundamental principles of statutory construction, the Eleventh Circuit found that the text of 1441 “as a whole” compels the conclusion that “defendants” as used in subsections (a) and (c) has the same meaning.  Id. at *16.  Second, the caption of Section 1441 – “Removal of civil actions” additionally bolstered this conclusion.  Id. at *17 (emphasis in original).  And third, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “still differentiate among third-party defendants, counterclaim defendants and defendants”—meaning that when Congress wishes to make removal available to parties other than the original defendant, “it says so”.  Id. at *19.

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held that consistent with Home Depot, third-party counterclaim defendants cannot remove a “civil action” under 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(c).  The federal district court in Bowling, however, had already granted the third-party counterclaim defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the federal claims asserted against them (including the FCRA).  No matter.  The former loan servicers initial decision to remove the case to federal court cost them this victory, as the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment.  The plaintiff’s third party counterclaims (including those under the FCRA) were remanded back to state court.  Id. at *21.

As the number of cases filed under the FCRA continues to rise (including cases filed in state court), removal will remain relevant as part of the strategic playbook of defending these litigations.  Bowling offers a cautionary note that the removal playing field is still adjusting and reaching a new normal as application of the Supreme Court’s Home Depot ruling plays out in the various Courts of Appeals.  Stay tuned.

The Eleventh Circuit vacated a $490,000 punitive damages award last Friday for a single FCRA violation, finding that there wasn’t enough proof of a willful violation. Considering that the jury had initially awarded $3 million in punitives (which the trial court cut to $490,000 on due process grounds), this is a big win for Experian. But, it wasn’t a total victory. The court upheld a “relatively modest” $5,000 compensatory damages award for the plaintiff’s physical pain and mental suffering, even though there were no economic losses.

The case—Younger v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 19170 (11th Cir. June 19, 2020)—involved credit card debt owned by a debt buyer, Portfolio Recovery Associates LLC (PRA). Before the case against Experian was filed, PRA sued Younger in small claims court over the debt. After that case was dismissed, Younger sent Experian a letter, asking it to remove the debt from his credit report.

For some unknown reason, Experian flagged the letter under the company’s suspicious mail policy, and did not open an investigation. Instead, per this policy, it sent a standard response letter asking Younger to call Experian if he thought anything on his report was inaccurate. Rather than calling Experian back about the debt, though, Younger sued Experian (as well as PRA and another CRA), who entered into settlements totaling $76,500 before trial) for claimed FCRA violations.

The relevant FCRA provisions require that consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) and furnishers reinvestigate disputes within 30 days after receiving a consumer’s dispute. CRAs must promptly notify the furnisher of any disputed info and “promptly” delete or modify anything that’s inaccurate. And, when they make changes based on reinvestigation, the CRA has to send the consumer the details and a copy of the full consumer report. Under the FCRA, CRAs have to maintain “reasonable procedures designed . . . to limit the furnishing of consumer reports” to permissible purposes, and Experian hung its hat on that requirement here

The plaintiff claimed that Experian “negligently and willfully” violated the FCRA by failing to reinvestigate the PRA credit after. The magistrate judge found as a matter of law that the failure to investigate was negligent. The jury awarded $5,000 in compensatory damages for the plaintiff’s pain and suffering based on his testimony that Experian’s letter and refusal to acknowledge his complaint stressed him out, caused him to lose sleep, and exacerbated a preexisting nerve injury and caused him pain. The Eleventh Circuit upheld this award based on the plaintiff’s testimony, despite noting that the claimed injuries were “impalpable.”

The jury also slapped the company with a huge punitive damages award (which the trial court reduced), but the Eleventh Circuit vacated that award completely, finding that there wasn’t enough evidence that Experian acted willfully. The plaintiff argued that Experian had recklessly disregarded the reinvestigation duty, and that its suspicious mail policy was designed to increase revenue by inducing the consumer to call Experian so that Experian could market its products during the phone call. Experian, on the other hand, claimed that that the policy was an anti-fraud measure, designed to sort out claims that did not appear to come directly from consumers and ensure that Experian did not send out any consumer reports for impermissible purposes. Because the policy “had a foundation in the statutory text,” the Eleventh Circuit held the violation wasn’t willful as a matter of law.

Despite the lack of punitives in the end, this case should remind CRAs and furnishers to take a look at their dispute intake procedures. The failure to investigate was ruled to be negligent as a matter of law here, and the plaintiff was able to get compensatory damages based on his claimed pain and suffering. To avoid liability, companies should ensure they’re promptly reinvestigating any consumer disputes, that all relevant info the consumer submits is reviewed and considered as part of this reinvestigation, and—at a bare minimum—that their policies are rooted in statutory text.

 

 

 

Here’s a handy dandy little decision for creditors/collectors to keep in mind.

When a consumer petitions for bankruptcy protection we all know (or should know) that collection efforts to that consumer must stop.  But can you still pull the consumer’s credit—assuming you otherwise have a permissible purpose–without violating the automatic stay?

According to one new case the answer is yes (!) but, watch out.

In In re Vargas, CASE NO. 19-50641-cag, CHAPTER 7, ADVERSARY NO. 19-05031-cag, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 1646 (W.D. Tx. June 19, 2020) a consumer got her dander up when a creditor pulled her credit (hard pull) after she had petitioned for Chapter 7 protection. The debtor brought an adversary proceeding—like a mini lawsuit within a pending BK proceeding—against  the creditor seeking sanctions for violation of the automatic stay.

The Plaintiff/Debtor’s argument was a pretty good one. The automatic stay rules prohibit “any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against debtor that arose before the commencement of the case.” And if the Defendant isn’t pulling credit to “assess” a claim on the debt then why is it pulling credit at all?

In assessing the issue, however, the Vargas court notes that Congress specifically allows credit reporting to continue through bankruptcy—assuming the right codes are used and all that—so why should credit pulling be treated any differently? The Defendant argued that pulling credit is not an act, standing alone, that is likely to lead to the collection of any debt. The Court seems to agree–although the reasoning is quite thin.  Nonetheless, noting that the Plaintiff/Debtor had failed to site any case law on the subject the court finds—without citing any case law of its own—that pulling credit does not violate the stay even if, as was apparently the case in Vargas, it was done as a first step in a collection effort.

Vargas is a great feather in a creditor’s cap but it is just one decision and not binding precedent. There’s a difference of opinion out there on this issue, to say the least. Be sure to reach out if you have questions about when it is, and is not, permissible to pull credit of a consumer in BK.

 

A recent decision from the Western District of Kentucky wound its way through a maze of permissible purposes and reasonable beliefs, with a detour into defamation claims, ultimately striking half of plaintiff’s claims. In Durbin v. Americredit Fin. Servs., No. 1:19-CV-00184-GNS, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101554 (W.D. Ky. June 9, 2020), the court found that plaintiff sufficiently pled a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), but struck defamation claims under dueling preemption provisions.  Plaintiff unsuccessfully defended his defamation claims by arguing that defendants, who plaintiff claimed had knowingly furnished inaccurate information, were not in fact “furnishers” under the preemption provisions.

Plaintiff had purchased a car from a dealer under a retail installment contract and security agreement (“RICS”) that allowed the dealer to assign the RICS to a credit union. Plaintiff later found out the credit union had rejected the RICS, requiring the dealer to find new financing, and discovered that each of seven named defendants had obtained his credit report, generating “hard inquiries” in each case.

Defendants asserted they had a permissible purpose in obtaining plaintiff’s credit report because they reasonably believed plaintiff was looking for an extension of credit. The court, however, disagreed, finding that plaintiff had sufficiently pled that defendants’ belief was not reasonable. Why? The RICS in question was a contract for a vehicle purchase, not a credit application – and it didn’t look like plaintiff had ever filled out a credit application. As the court found, the burden of proof was on defendants to justify their reasonable belief that plaintiff was seeking credit. Lacking such proof, the court allowed plaintiff’s FCRA claims to proceed.

Plaintiff’s defamation claims did not fare as well. The defamation claims were based on defendants falsely furnishing information to the consumer reporting agencies (“CRAs”) that plaintiff had initiated a credit transaction. On that basis, defendants asserted the defamation claims were preempted under two provisions of the FCRA, § 1681h(e) and § 1681t(b)(1)(F). As the court noted, these provisions “have been the source of much debate.”  Section 1681t(b)(1)(F) grants immunity to furnishers from state law claims when fulfilling their obligations as furnishers to CRAs under § 1681s-2.  Section 1681h(e) is narrower, and immunizes furnishers from state law claims of defamation, slander, or invasion of privacy, except in cases where a consumer claims false information has been furnished with malice or willful intent to injure the consumer.

So how were these two sections balanced? The court ultimately applied a “temporal approach,” one of three possible methods of interpreting the two preemption provisions. Under this approach, § 1681t(b) is interpreted to preempt state law claims that relate to the furnishing of disputed information once the furnisher knew or had reason to know of any inaccuracies, and § 1681h(e) is interpreted to preempt state law claims brought before the furnisher knew or had reason to know of an inaccuracy. The court found that plaintiff’s claims were preempted under § 1681t(b)(1)(F), because plaintiff had alleged that the defendants furnished information that they knew or should have known was false.  Plaintiff’s unusual defense against this finding was that the defendants were actually users of credit reports under the FCRA. The court put it best: plaintiff “is suing for Defendants’ furnishing of information while simultaneously arguing that Defendants cannot be considered a furnisher of information.”

An interesting point here- the plaintiff was right:  in obtaining a credit report and thus generating an inquiry, the defendants were not acting as furnishers, but only as users. Had plaintiff’s claimed been drafted in such a way as not to characterize the defendants’ activity as “furnishing” (and this raising the preemption defense), his claim may very well have survived the motion to dismiss.

This case shows the importance of being able to demonstrate a reasonable belief as a defense – it can’t simply be claimed. And furnishers beware: while this court adopted one approach for preemption, it also considered two other distinct approaches that other courts have adopted. Your (preemption) mileage may vary.

In a class action involving an allegation that an employer failed to give the “stand-alone” disclosure that is required  under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) before obtaining a consumer report, the Ninth Circuit clarified what is necessary in order to have Article III standing in this context.

Section 604(b)(2)(A)(i) of the FCRA requires that before a consumer report may be obtained on a consumer for employment purposes, the employer must provide the consumer with a “clear and conspicuous disclosure … in a document that consists solely of the disclosure,” that a consumer report may be obtained about such consumer.  In Ruiz v. Shamrock Foods Co., No. 18-56209 (9th Cir., Mar. 2020), plaintiffs alleged that their employer violated the FCRA by including extraneous information in the disclosure they received.  With respect to some of the plaintiffs, such extraneous information consisted of information regarding state law entitlements.  In other cases, a liability waiver was included.

Relying on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Syed v. M-I-, LLC, 852 F.3d 492 (9th Cir. 2017), plaintiffs argued that the extraneous information rendered the form confusing and plaintiffs were therefore concretely injured, for purposes of establishing  Article III standing. However, the Ninth Circuit clarified that Syed stands for the proposition that to establish Article III standing, applicants must  demonstrate that because of the alleged FCRA violation, they had been “deprived of their ability to meaningfully authorize a credit check.”  In Syed, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff had adequately alleged that he had been so deprived, because he produced evidence that allowed the court to infer that he would not have signed the authorization had he been provided only the disclosure and nothing else, as the FCRA requires.

In Ruiz, on the other hand, plaintiffs offered no evidence either that they were confused by the disclosure or that they would not have signed it had the disclosure complied with the FCRA.  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs did not have Article III standing.

The lesson for employers from  this case is that had the plaintiffs’ pleadings been more robust, the court may well have found standing under Syed, and thus, rather than dismissal, the employer may be facing FCRA liability for technically non-compliant forms.  It’s worth pointing out as well that the extraneous disclosure found in many of the disclosure documents in this case was not self-serving liability waivers, but disclosure about consumers’ rights under state law!  When even such consumer-friendly disclosure as that seems to be in violation of the FCRA, employers really need to scrutinize their disclosure and authorization forms very carefully to ensure that they are not inviting litigation.

 

On Friday, after reviewing Plaintiff’s credit reports which were ordered by the Court last month, the Honorable Laurie J. Michelson, dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Michigan First, concluding there was no inaccurate or misleading reporting. (See Rider v. Equifax Info. Servs. LLC, No. 2:19-cv-13660, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99265, at *2 (E.D. Mich. June 5, 2020.)) Plaintiff had alleged that Michigan First negligently failed to conduct a proper investigation of her dispute as required by 15 USC 1681s-2(b), and that it had “willfully failed to conduct a proper reinvestigation of [her] dispute.” HOWEVER, both of Plaintiff’s disputed credit reports indicated Plaintiff’s Michigan First account as having a “zero balance” and also included the closing date for her account. Take as a whole, neither of the tradelines would be considered misleading, ruled the Court. And the Court went on to further state “Michigan First is not the consumer reporting agency—it reports to the consumer reporting agency. So Michigan First does not control how the data it provides is presented.” Just because there is a tradeline reflecting a closed account on a credit report (within the statutorily permitted reporting period) does not mean that the credit report is inaccurate, it is the information contained within the tradeline that determines the accuracy-and after reviewing that very information in the disputed tradeline in the aforementioned case, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s allegations as insufficient.

Standing to bring suit is an issue that is never waived and never goes away, regardless of the parties’ arguments.  Recently, the Ninth Circuit reviewed an appeal of an FCRA claim that had gone through discovery, summary judgment, and a fully briefed appeal.  It determined that the parties and the lower court had focused on the wrong issue—and spent time, effort, and money on litigation that was ultimately undone—because the plaintiff didn’t have standing and shouldn’t have been able to bring suit in the first place.

In Hogue v. Silver State Schs. Credit Union, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 15963, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s grant of summary judgment on an FCRA claim in favor of a credit furnisher…but not on the grounds the district court granted it.  Instead, the Ninth Circuit determined—independently of the parties and the district court—that the consumer never had standing to bring suit in the first place.

The plaintiff sued the defendant furnisher, claiming that it erroneously reported an auto loan as past due to a credit reporting agency, then failed to investigate the dispute once the plaintiff raised it.  The district court granted summary judgment to the furnisher after discovery, holding that the furnisher met its obligations under the FCRA.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the allegations the plaintiff made and determined that he had never alleged a concrete injury sufficient to give him constitutional standing to sue.

Not only had no third party ever made an adverse credit decision based on the disputed information, the disputed information had fallen off of the plaintiff’s account by the time he sued, meaning it would never be reported at all.  In fact, the plaintiff couldn’t even show that there was a risk the disputed information would be disseminated.  The district court’s dismissal was affirmed, but purely on standing grounds, without ever reaching the issues addressed by the district court.

The lesson for FCRA defendants: always keep an eye out for standing issues.  A successful standing challenge could save you a lot of time and energy spent on unnecessary discovery.

“It appears that there are at least eight cases in this District where the plaintiffs make the same claims against Michigan First. And in each case, the plaintiffs are represented by the same counsel. And in each case, Michigan First is represented by the same counsel,” the Honorable Laurie J. Michelson of the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, commented in Rider v. Equifax Info. Servs. LLC, No. 2:19-cv-13660, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89359(E.D. Mich. May 21, 2020.) The Rider decision is truly interesting not only because it begs the question of what was/is going on with Michigan First’s credit reporting, but also because of the court’s resolution focused ruling.

Plaintiff Danielle Rider obtained a credit report from Equifax which listed a tradeline – i.e. a credit account listing – showing monthly payments of $151 to Michigan First. Rider disputed the accuracy of this tradeline as she was no longer obligated to make these payments. As a result, she sent a letter to Equifax, explaining that her account with Michigan First had been “paid and closed,” and that the tradeline on her credit report should show the payments to be $0, instead of $150. Equifax forwarded her complaint to Michigan First. After waiting a few months, Rider ordered another credit report, which did not show a $0 payment under the Michigan First tradeline-however, Rider did not indicate what exactly was reported under the Michigan First tradeline. Rider subsequently filed a lawsuit, alleging (amongst other claims) Michigan First violated the FCRA as a result of their negligent investigation, or alternatively, willfully failing to review all relevant information.

As we know, the FCRA mandates furnishers not to furnish any information relating to a consumer if they know, or have a reasonable cause to believe, that the information is inaccurate. The FCRA does not however provide precise instructions to furnishers on how to report the information. And in fact, if Rider’s credit reports showed a non-zero monthly payment amount to Michigan First without any clarifying information, it could well have been plausible that the Michigan First tradeline was inaccurate or incomplete. But if the tradeline stated “historical” and “closed,” or similar language, it probably was not inaccurate or incomplete. And that critical piece of information was missing in either parties briefing– i.e. what exactly was reported in Rider’s subsequent credit report?!

In addition to the overarching duty of furnishing accurate information, after receiving a notice disputing the completeness OR accuracy of any information that has been provided by the furnisher, a furnisher must:

(A) conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed information;

(B) review all relevant information provided by the consumer reporting agency…;

(C) report the results of the investigation to the consumer reporting agency;

(D) if the investigation finds that the information is incomplete or inaccurate, report those results to all other consumer reporting agencies to which the person furnished the information and that compile and maintain files on consumers on a nationwide basis; and

(E) if an item of information disputed by a consumer is found to be inaccurate or incomplete or cannot be verified after any reinvestigation under paragraph (1), for purposes of reporting to a consumer reporting agency only, as appropriate, based on the results of the reinvestigation promptly—

(i) modify that item of information;

(ii) delete that item of information; or

(iii) permanently block the reporting of that item of information.

See 15 U.S.C § 1681 for the detailed statute

 The FCRA also requires furnishers to establish and implement reasonable written policies and procedures concerning the accuracy and integrity of the information it furnishes to consumer reporting agencies. The guidelines are provided under Appendix A to Furnisher Rule Part 660.

In response to her complaint, Michigan First argued that Rider did not adequately plead that the tradeline is “inaccurate,” or that Michigan First conducted an “inadequate investigation,” or that she was “damaged,” and requested that the complaint be dismissed. While acknowledging Michigan First’s argument, taking on a resolution focused approach, the Court ordered Rider to docket the two credit reports so the Court could ascertain if the credit reporting was in fact inaccurate, or alternatively, asked Rider to  dismiss her complaint by May 29, 2020.

For any Furnisher, it is incumbent to have solid compliance policies governing credit reporting disputes. If Michigan First had successfully convinced the Court that the reporting was in fact accurate, it is possible that the Court may not have requested Plaintiff to supplement her complaint with the two credit reports. Arguably, the Court felt the need to review the credit reports before it could rule on the FCRA violations alleged. It is rare for the courts to go so far in a 12(b)6 motion, but always refreshing to see creative resolutions to run-of-the-mill disputes. All to say, it’s unlikely that the FCRA is turning into the notorious California Lemon Law, just yet, but it’s still a heavily litigated statute, so STAY TUNED, while we help decipher all the developments for you!