Introduction

The Ninth Circuit spent the first week of November reminding companies that an online arbitration agreement is only as good as the display that presents it to consumers. In two unpublished rulings filed a day apart, separate panels affirmed orders denying motions to compel arbitration in privacy class actions.

In Nader v. LendingTree, LLC, No. 25-7045 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2026), the panel found that the websites never gave users reasonably conspicuous notice of the arbitration terms.

In Morrison v. Yippee Entertainment, Inc., No. 25-7161 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 2026), the panel accepted that the arbitration terms were visible but nevertheless found that the signup screen never told users which click would signal their agreement.

Neither decision is precedential, but collectively they underscore how closely the Ninth Circuit (and district courts within the Ninth Circuit) scrutinize design choices companies often treat as routine. For defendants in consumer privacy litigations, arbitration agreements and class action waivers are important strategic levers, making potential lessons extend well beyond these two cases.

Legal Background

Both litigations concerned what is commonly referred to as a “sign-in wrap” agreement, which is one method by which websites obtain assent to electronic contracts. In this type of agreement, “the website provides a link to terms of use and indicates that some action may bind the user but does not require that the user actually review those terms.”

Under California law, an arbitration agreement contained in online terms of service is enforceable only if (1) the website provides reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms, and (2) the consumer takes some action, such as clicking a button or checking a box, that unambiguously manifests assent. Hyperlinks can be used to disclose terms, but their presence must be “readily apparent,” among other criteria. 

California courts apply a “traditional inquiry related to the visuals involved with the notice, such as font size, text placement, and overall screen design”—which was similarly utilized by the Ninth Circuit panels in these cases recently decided.

A Notice Deficiency Precludes Arbitration in the Snowflake Data Breach MDL

The Nader appeal (captioned, through an apparent typo, as In re Snowlake, Inc. Data Security Breach Litigation) came out of the multidistrict litigation over the Snowflake breach.  Defendants sought to send the claims against them to arbitration under the terms of use on their websites by filing a motion to compel arbitration.  This motion was denied by the lower court and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.  

Reviewing the case on appeal, the Ninth Circuit found the terms of service involved “did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms of use containing the arbitration provision.” The terms appeared in font that was considerably smaller than the surrounding text. 

The arbitration language also only appeared once consumers scrolled past other content, including a “Good News! We’ve Found Matches For You!” banner and a bright green “Get My Quotes” box.  According to the Court, “The notice seems to fade into the irrelevancy of other aspects of the page” because the webpage has multiple hyperlinks and “varying font sizes and images.” 

Thus, the Court held, the absence of conspicuous notice of the arbitration provision precluded consumers’ consent to arbitration.

Morrison v. Yippee Entertainment: An Assent Failure in a Video Privacy Protection Act Putative Class Action

Morrison picks up the arbitration analysis where Nader stopped.  Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Yippee Entertainment, Inc., alleging that Defendant shared information identifying Plaintiff’s video viewing with a third party for advertising without her consent. In a prior 2025 appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that Defendant’s terms were reasonably conspicuous but left open whether users had actually manifested assent to them.  On remand, the Southern District of California found that they had not and again denied arbitration, which was affirmed this month on appeal.

On the merits, the panel applied California precedent holding that assent to a sign-in wrap occurs only where the user is explicitly advised that clicking will constitute assent to the terms. The court emphasized that “[e]ven strongly implicit advisement isn’t enough.” The page must explain which actions will be treated as assent “[a]nd it must identify what, exactly, those actions are.”

Defendant’s site, by contrast, told users that they accepted the terms, arbitration clause included, by “clicking below,” but it never said that this meant the “Start Subscription” button. In fact, six clickable items sat below it: links to Defendant’s terms, cookie policy, and privacy policy, the “Start Subscription” button, and links to Google’s terms and privacy policy. The court found “no explicit indication which of these clickable items ‘below’ manifests assent to arbitrate.” (emphasis supplied). 

Implications for Data Privacy Class Actions and Arbitrations

The Ninth Circuit in recent years has focused what is required for online contract formation. These rulings arrive as consumer privacy class actions continue to proliferate on multiple fronts, including website claims focused on chatbots, session replay, and third-party tracking technologies.

In these cases, the defendant’s relationship with the putative class typically exists only electronically, so the enforceability of its terms of use often determines whether the case proceeds as a putative class action in court or as individual arbitrations.

The stakes cut both ways in the arbitration context. A company that cannot establish formation loses the ability to require individual arbitration and faces litigation from a putative class. But a company whose terms are enforceable should still consider whether its arbitration program is built to handle the mass arbitration campaigns that plaintiffs’ firms increasingly file when class actions are foreclosed, including fee obligations, batching provisions, and bellwether procedures.

Privacy World will continue to monitor developments in this area. Stay tuned.

On September 30, 2026, Governor Newsom signed Senate Bill 690 (“SB 690”). The law ends private plaintiffs’ ability to sue over website and app tracking under the “pen register” and “trap and trace” provisions of the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”), Cal. Penal Code § 638.51. Over the past two years, those provisions have become one of the plaintiffs’ bar’s favorite tools for targeting the cookies, pixels, and analytics software found on most business websites. Beginning January 1, 2027, private plaintiffs will no longer be able to bring these claims. The law also applies retroactively to pending claims in cases filed on or after January 1, 2025.

Meanwhile, the California Court of Appeal has before it the leading test case on the pen register theory, Variety Media, LLC v. Superior Court. That case could produce the first California appellate authority on Section 638.51, unless the court decides that SB 690 has made it moot.

How Website Tracking Became a “Pen Register” Problem

Traditionally, a pen register is a device that records the numbers dialed from a telephone line, and a trap and trace device records the numbers of incoming calls. California enacted its versions of these provisions largely to give law enforcement a state-law mechanism for obtaining court orders to collect that kind of data. Plaintiffs have nonetheless argued that ordinary website tools qualify as pen registers because they collect information such as a visitor’s IP address and device details and send it to third parties. Because CIPA provides statutory damages of $5,000 per violation, these lawsuits, and the demand letters that often come before them, have created significant settlement pressure despite mixed results in the courts.

As we covered last December, one federal court was frustrated enough with the statute to urge the Legislature to “go back to the drawing board on CIPA.” This fall, the Legislature took a first step.

SB 690 Ends Private Pen Register Suits Over Websites and Apps

SB 690 amends CIPA’s civil remedy provision, Cal. Penal Code § 637.2. Under the amendment, a claim against a private actor for a Section 638.51 violation “alleged to arise from conduct occurring on an internet website, online application, or mobile application may be brought under this section only by the Attorney General.” The Assembly and the Senate both passed the final version unanimously. Section 638.51 itself remains on the books, and the Attorney General can still enforce it. The key change is that private plaintiffs can no longer pursue this theory against websites and apps.

More amendments may be coming. In his signing message, Governor Newsom called on the Legislature to revisit CIPA next year to address its “other decades-old statutes that are also susceptible to abuse by overly aggressive litigants,” while “ensur[ing] a fair balance between protecting private information and preventing rapacious litigation.”

SB 690 Takes Effect January 1, 2027, and Reaches Cases Filed Since January 1, 2025

SB 690 takes effect on January 1, 2027. Until then, private plaintiffs can technically keep filing and litigating Section 638.51 claims. Any newly filed claim is likely to fail, however, because of SB 690’s retroactive reach. The law applies to “any pending claim in an action commenced within two years before” its operative date, which covers cases filed on or after January 1, 2025.

Courts are already taking notice. On October 28, 2026, in Torres v. SeatGeek, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed a website tracking suit for lack of standing (a theme we have covered before). The court also observed that letting the plaintiff amend the pen register claim would be futile because SB 690 will eliminate the private right of action for that claim.

Still, plaintiffs can be expected to challenge the retroactivity provision. The bill includes a severability clause meant to preserve the rest of the law if that provision is struck down. As previously covered on Privacy World, the Seventh Circuit recently held that Illinois’ 2024 amendment limiting BIPA damages applies retroactively to pending cases. California courts will apply their own retroactivity rules to SB 690, but the Seventh Circuit’s decision shows that courts are willing to apply exposure-limiting amendments to cases already underway.

Court of Appeal Asks Whether SB 690 Moots Variety Media

Variety Media arises from Rose v. Variety Media, LLC, a Los Angeles Superior Court case filed on January 23, 2025, that asserts a single claim under Section 638.51. The plaintiff alleges that third-party trackers on Variety’s website sent visitors’ IP addresses and device information to data brokers. After the trial court overruled Variety’s demurrer (California’s version of a motion to dismiss), Variety petitioned for a writ of mandate. A writ petition lets an appellate court review a trial court ruling before the case is over. The Court of Appeal agreed to hear the petition and stayed the trial court proceedings. The case drew amicus briefs from business groups, technology companies, and privacy advocates, and many courts have stayed pending pen register cases until it is decided.

On August 21, 2026, the court issued a tentative ruling that gave each side something. It rejected Variety’s main argument that CIPA’s pen register provisions apply only to telephones, concluding that California’s definition is “coextensive with the federal definition” and can reach internet communications. But it agreed with Variety on a narrower point. A pen register captures information that identifies the destination of an outgoing communication, much like the numbers a caller dials. A website visitor’s own IP address, by contrast, “identifies the source of the communication—not its destination.”

On October 1, 2026, after SB 690 became law, the court on its own motion vacated submission of the case. It directed the parties to brief whether SB 690 makes the writ proceeding moot and, if so, whether an exception to the mootness doctrine applies. Put simply, courts generally will not decide a case when their ruling can no longer make a practical difference. They may make an exception, however, for issues of broad public interest that are likely to recur. The parties filed briefs on October 8 and October 15, and the case was resubmitted on October 15. As of this writing, no decision has issued. California appellate courts generally must decide a case within 90 days of submission, which points to a decision by mid-January 2027, shortly after SB 690 takes effect.

Conclusion

SB 690 is a significant development for businesses that operate websites and apps in California. It sharply curtails one of the plaintiffs’ bar’s most aggressive CIPA theories of recent years, and it reaches back to cases filed since January 1, 2025. But it is not a complete shield. Plaintiffs are expected to shift to CIPA’s wiretapping and eavesdropping provisions and other theories, and the Governor has signaled that further reform may come in 2027. Companies facing pending Section 638.51 claims should evaluate whether SB 690 will extinguish those claims and consider raising the new law with the court now. For practical compliance steps, see our recent Privacy World post on reviewing website tracking technologies in light of SB 690.

Stay tuned to Privacy World for further developments, including the Court of Appeal’s decision in Variety Media.

Our Data Privacy team remains at the forefront of developments shaping privacy, AI, advertising technology, and regulatory compliance. Explore our upcoming speaking engagements below, and if you missed a recent presentation, access the recording at your convenience. We would love to connect with you!

On-Demand

If you missed Alan Friel’s October 20th webinar “The Defensibility Imperative: Transforming Complex DSR Operations Across the Enterprise”, presented by Exterro, a recording is now available. Alan joined an expert panel that included Fahad Diwan, Director of Product Marketing & Management, Privacy, Data Governance at Exterro, and K Royal, Deputy General Counsel at Crawford & Company to discuss global privacy regulations as they continue to expand and organizations face increasing pressure to comply with data subject rights (DSR) requests within strict statutory deadlines. Privacy teams are being challenged to move beyond basic intake automation and build truly defensible privacy operations. The discussion explored the operational realities of managing complex DSRs across disparate systems, including data discovery, redaction, audit readiness, and employee access requests. To access the recording, click here.

Upcoming Speaking Engagements

  • November 10, 2026, Alan Friel, Partner (Atlanta/Los Angeles),and Julia Jacobson, Partner (New York), come together for an online CLE opportunity with NBI to discuss: AI Vendor Claims and Contracts. AI vendors make bold promises about accuracy, uptime, and security. Their contracts often tell a different story. This program gives business law attorneys a practical framework for evaluating AI vendor claims against contractual reality: what to look for, what to push back on, and how to negotiate terms that protect your clients. You’ll examine how standard AI vendor agreements shift risk to the customer, which provisions warrant the hardest scrutiny, and what regulators and courts are beginning to expect when companies rely on AI vendor representations. Walk away with a due diligence plan and negotiation strategies you can put to work immediately. Free passes are available! To reserve yours, please reach out to Elizabeth Roby.
  • November 17, 2026 at 1:00pm, join Kyle Dull, Senior Associate (Miami/New York), for a timely webinar on “Beyond the Cookie Banner: Technical Audits and Wiretapping Litigation”.  Recent enforcement actions have demonstrated that enforcement agencies are now conducting deep-dive technical audits of businesses to determine compliance with applicable law. Plaintiff’s firms are also conducting similar automated technical audits to identify tracking technologies and misconfigured banners, to support allegations that these practices amount to illegal wiretapping – and therefore a basis for thousands of demand letters. This session will analyze enforcement trends, claims from plaintiff’s firms, and provide a roadmap for ad tech best practices to mitigate a business’ risk. Review the latest on Strategic Cookie Management: Tracking, Technology Compliance, Challenges and Strategies. For more information or to register for this session, click here and use code WEBGUEST2026.
  • Attending the 2026 Internet Advertising Bureau State Privacy Law Summit, November 18, 2026? Julia Jacobson, Partner (New York), will be attending and speaking on an engaging panel exploring: Managing Consent and Transparency for Automated Personal Data Processing. More details to follow. For latest updates, visit here.

Stay Ahead on Consumer Privacy News

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In case you missed it, below are recent posts from Privacy World covering the latest developments on data privacy, security and innovation. Please reach out to the authors if you are interested in additional information.

Still in the Driver’s Seat: DPPA Litigation Risk Persists for Companies Handling State DMV Data

The EU KIDS Act: From moderation to mandatory design

“A Trust Betrayed Is the Harm”: Ninth Circuit Rules Breach of Confidence Supplies Article III Standing in Data Privacy Cases, Deepening Circuit Split

Mass Arbitration Is Not Slowing Down: What the AAA’s Data Means for 2026 and 2027

Fifth Circuit Revives Meta Pixel Privacy Class Action, Expanding Litigation Risk for Website Data

Stay Ahead on Consumer Privacy News

Not a subscriber yet? Subscribe here to be among the first to receive timely updates on the fast-moving world of data privacy, security, and innovation—delivered straight to your inbox.

Looking for deeper insights and expert analysis? You can also subscribe here to our privacy attorneys’ marketing communications for thought leadership and rich content when you need a more comprehensive perspective.

A parking operator photographs a license plate, runs a routine owner lookup through a data vendor, and mails a payment notice. An insurer’s online quote tool pre-fills a driver’s license number to speed up the customer experience. A state agency’s website runs a standard advertising pixel. None of these practices appear significant at first glance, yet each became the basis for a plaintiff to assert claims on behalf of a putative class under the 1994 Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”).

More than 30 years after its enactment, the DPPA remains a privacy statute of continued focus by the plaintiffs’ bar, including particularly Florida, Georgia, New York, and California, among other states. Because the statute provides liquidated damages of $2,500 per violation without requiring proof of actual harm, a single data flow repeated across thousands of drivers can quickly translate into eight- or nine-figure exposure. And the DPPA reaches far beyond state motor vehicle departments: it applies to any person or business that knowingly obtains, uses, discloses, or rediscloses personal information derived from motor vehicle records for a purpose the statute does not permit.

For in-house counsel, the challenge is that DMV-sourced data often enters a company indirectly, through data brokers, vendors, analytics tools, or business partners, and its origin may not be obvious to the business teams using it. This article outlines the DPPA’s core framework, including its permissible uses and redisclosure recordkeeping obligations; traces how DPPA litigation has evolved from its roots in marketing and solicitation into data breach, website tracking, and automated license plate reader (“ALPR”) cases; and offers practical steps legal and compliance teams can take now to identify and reduce DPPA exposure.

I. DPPA Background

The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725, is a federal statute that limits how state departments of motor vehicles (“DMVs”) disclose personal information from driver and vehicle records. It also limits how anyone else may obtain, use, disclose, or redisclose that information.

Section 2721(a) bars a state DMV, and its officers, employees, and contractors, from knowingly disclosing personal information obtained in connection with a motor vehicle record except as provided in subsection (b). Section 2722(a) separately makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly obtain or disclose personal information from a motor vehicle record for any use not permitted under § 2721(b).

Section 2724(a), in turn, creates a private right of action against any person who “knowingly obtains, discloses or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for a purpose not permitted under this chapter.”

Section 2721(b) enumerates 14 permissible uses, including use for motor vehicle or driver safety; use by a licensed private investigative agency or licensed security service for a purpose otherwise permitted under subsection (b); and certain uses for which the State has obtained the express consent of the person to whom the information pertains.

Redisclosure is governed separately. Section 2721(c) permits an authorized recipient of personal information (other than a recipient under subsection (b)(11) or (12)) to resell or redisclose the information only for a use permitted under subsection (b), excluding uses under subsection (b)(11) or (12). Any authorized recipient that resells or rediscloses personal information (other than a recipient under subsection (b)(11)) must keep, for five years, records identifying each person or entity that receives the information and the permitted purpose for which it will be used, and must make those records available to the DMV upon request.

The DPPA defines “personal information” as information that identifies an individual, including an individual’s photograph, Social Security number, driver identification number, name, address (but not the five-digit ZIP code), telephone number, and medical or disability information. Although the statute does not expressly list email addresses, the Eleventh Circuit has held that email addresses are personal information because they identify an individual.

II. DPPA Litigation: Then and Now

Congress enacted the DPPA in response to growing concerns about the misuse of personal information held by state DMVs. Two concerns predominated. The first was the threat posed by stalkers using DMV data. The incident most often credited with spurring the legislation was the 1989 murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer, whose stalker obtained her home address from California DMV records through a private investigator. See 145 Cong. Rec. S14533–02.

The second concern was the states’ common practice of selling personal information to businesses engaged in direct marketing and solicitation, which remains one of the most developed areas of DPPA litigation.

In a 2013 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed a case in which attorneys obtained motor vehicle records containing vehicle purchasers’ personal information and used it to send letters inviting the recipients to join lawsuits against automobile dealerships. The attorneys argued that their conduct fell within the litigation exception in § 2721(b)(4), which permits use in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or arbitral proceeding, including investigation in anticipation of litigation. The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that the DPPA’s exceptions are to be read narrowly and that, although obtaining and using the information may serve multiple purposes, solicitation of clients is not a permissible use under (b)(4) where, as there, solicitation was the “predominant purpose” of obtaining and using the information.

While marketing and solicitation cases remain prevalent, plaintiffs’ firms are increasingly testing the 1994 statute against modern data practices. In the data breach context, plaintiffs have repeatedly added DPPA claims to negligence suits against companies whose systems were hacked. Results have been mixed and turn largely on whether the company itself knowingly “disclosed” the information. In 2024, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed a DPPA claim in a consolidated data breach litigation because the complaint alleged only that inadequate server security allowed hackers to steal data, not a knowing disclosure by the company.

By contrast, the Eastern District of New York allowed a DPPA claim to proceed in a data breach litigation against an auto insurer where plaintiffs alleged that the companies affirmatively auto-populated or transmitted driver’s license numbers through online quote forms or portals without adequate safeguards, conduct closer to a knowing disclosure than a passive server vulnerability. The line between affirmative and passive disclosure has become a central battleground in these cases.

A second, more recent wave of cases targets tracking technology on state DMV websites. Plaintiffs allege that social media and professional networking platforms violate the DPPA by obtaining tracking identifiers when users visit DMV websites and then using that data for advertising.

Courts have been skeptical. In 2023, the District of South Carolina held that a user’s platform ID generated by a tracking cookie did not come “from” a motor vehicle record, as the DPPA requires, because the ID resulted from the user’s independent decision to use the platform rather than from information the DMV provided. Similarly, the Northern District of California dismissed a DPPA claim because the plaintiff failed to explain how URLs and user-entered information collected by tracking technology qualified as a “motor vehicle record.” These decisions limit the DPPA’s reach in the digital-tracking context, although the statute’s damages provision gives plaintiffs continued incentive to test the theory.

The newest DPPA cases target commercial use of ALPRs. Since 2024, plaintiffs have filed numerous suits against parking companies that obtain DMV data to issue parking notices. A typical complaint alleges that cameras capture license plates, the company runs a “DMV lookup” through data brokers, and the company then uses the resulting owner information to mail payment demands. Federal courts in Florida, including in the Southern and Northern Districts of Florida, have allowed these claims to survive motions to dismiss in decisions issued in 2025 and 2026.

III. Key Risks in DPPA Litigation & Takeaways for Businesses

These litigation trends carry practical consequences. The DPPA’s damages structure makes it particularly attractive for class actions or mass arbitrations: the statute provides a private right of action with liquidated damages of $2,500 per violation, making it a powerful supplement to common-law claims that otherwise require proof of actual harm. And the statute reaches any person who knowingly obtains, uses, or discloses DMV-sourced information for an impermissible purpose, not just DMVs themselves. As class counsel continue to test new theories, businesses should take care.

Companies that collect, license, buy, sell, or use driver or vehicle data should determine whether any of it originated in motor vehicle records. Private entities, including data brokers, insurers, law firms, employers, and private investigators, that obtain or use DMV-sourced information should confirm that each use is a permissible one under § 2721(b). Those that resell or redisclose the information must also confirm that each downstream recipient has a permissible use and must keep records of those redisclosures for five years (unless they received the information under subsection (b)(11)). The DPPA’s limits on marketing and solicitation absent express consent also significantly restrict the ability of direct marketers and attorneys to use DMV data for outreach. Finally, companies should be familiar with any state-law analogues to the DPPA.

Squire Patton Boggs’ Data Disputes team has significant experience defending DPPA claims and helping businesses navigate overlapping federal and state requirements. Stay tuned to Privacy World for further developments.

What it means for product design, age assurance and data protection

On September 17, 2026, the European Commission (Commission) adopted its proposal for the EU KIDS Act (Keeping Internet Digital Spaces Accountable and Trustworthy), a new regulation aimed at strengthening the protection of minors online. It applies to the digital services and products children use every day: social media, video sharing platforms, online games, app stores and AI companions or chatbots.

Until now, the protection of minors online rested on a general legal obligation under existing EU law (notably Article 28 of the Digital Services Act (DSA)), fleshed out mainly through nonbinding European Commission guidelines that left considerable room for each platform’s own interpretation. The KIDS Act changes that starting point. It converts a defined set of design choices (how accounts are created, how notifications and recommender systems operate, as well as how AI chatbots are allowed to interact with a child) into specific legal requirements. Its reach is broad. It covers providers of social networks, video-sharing platforms, app stores, online games, operating systems, AI companions and general conversational chatbots accessible to minors, wherever they are established, as long as they offer their services to users in the EU or place their AI systems on the EU market.

There is no size threshold and small and micro enterprises are not exempted; only a closed list of low-risk services (such as not-for-profit encyclopedias, educational services and services run by public authorities) falls outside.

Nor does the KIDS Act start from a blank page. Sectors such as video games already operate under well-established self-regulatory codes, Pan-European Game Information (PEGI) age ratings among them and audiovisual content is subject to its own sectoral rules on the protection of minors, both of which the proposal builds on rather than replaces. That shift, from broad principle to specific obligation, is what matters most for those subject to the regulation, more than any individual age.

I. Why this matters beyond compliance

  • The cost stops being purely legal and becomes a product cost – The safety by design rules in the proposal (limits on infinite scroll and reward mechanics, default settings for recommender systems, mandatory time and contact controls) are requirements about how a product is built, not policies written after the fact, and the largest platforms must prove compliance through independent audits. That moves the decision from the legal department to the product team and, with it, the question of who inside the organization actually owns the risk.
  • Age verification becomes critical infrastructure and a data protection question –The regulation builds on the EU Digital Identity framework and the EU Age Verification Scheme, as well as requires every member state to offer at least one free, privacy preserving way to verify a user’s age. Simply asking a user to state their age is no longer enough to count as compliance. Verifying the age of every user, however, means processing data about adults and minors at scale. Providers will need a clear legal basis under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), a data protection impact assessment and a solution that respects data minimization. To give an example, the Spanish data protection authority (AEPD) has already set out principles for age verification built on non-identification and non-traceability, which are a useful benchmark for the choices now to be made.
  • Meeting the KIDS Act does not automatically mean meeting the DSA –Complying with the new rules is treated as sufficient for the matters they cover, but the proposal is explicit that this does not prove compliance with the DSA’s broader minor protection obligation as a whole, since some aspects, security among them, remain outside the KIDS Act altogether. A platform can therefore tick every KIDS Act box and still fall short under the wider DSA duty. That gap is worth mapping now, before an audit finds it first.
  • This is still an open text, not a closed rule – The proposal has only just entered the ordinary legislative procedure before Parliament and the European Council. There is a real window to help shape the final wording, and providers who engage with that process now are in a better position than those who simply wait for a final version to comply with.

II. The main obligations, briefly

  • Age-based access –The proposal sets three tiers for social networks and video sharing services. Below 13, no account at all, save that video platforms built specifically for young children may exceptionally allow access, but only through the guardian’s own account, never a separate one for the child. At 13 and 14, a guardian can set up a limited account on the minor’s behalf, capped at one hour of use a day, with guardian controls that must stay active at all times and new contacts requiring the guardian’s approval beforehand. From 15, the minor may open their own account. Note that this does not align with the age of digital consent under Article 8 GDPR, which Spain sets at 14: for the 13-14 tier, providers will need to work out who consents to which processing.
  • Accounts that already exist – Providers have six months from the moment that the regulation starts applying to work out which existing account holders are under 15, and to disable any account that turns out to belong to a minor in that bracket, or whose age simply cannot be confirmed. In practice this is a large-scale automated exercise affecting adults as well as minors. Providers should plan for GDPR issues around automated decisions, what happens to the data of disabled accounts and complaints from adults wrongly caught.
  • Safety built into the product – The proposal bans features designed to encourage compulsive or excessive use, and requires services to protect school hours and sleep time. Recommender systems must give priority to what a minor explicitly asks for, switch off recommendations based on implicit engagement signals by default and always offer at least one option that is not based on profiling. AI companions and chatbots come with a specific rule of their own. They must be designed so as not to foster emotional dependency in a minor.
  • App stores as gatekeepers – Software application stores must run an age rating system and block minors from downloading apps rated as not appropriate for their age.
  • Closer supervision for very large platforms – Platforms designated as very large online platforms must submit a compliance plan within four months of that designation, commission an independent audit whose final report is due within two months, and, if the Commission finds gaps, submit a corrective action plan within 30 days. Each corrective measure must then be implemented within a period set by the provider in that plan, which may not exceed 60 days. Importantly, none of this (not the audit or the commission’s silence on it) amounts to a formal finding that the platform is compliant.
  • Enforcement – The proposal does not create a new enforcement system, it relies on the existing structures under the DSA and the AI Act, so the Commission supervises very large online platforms and national authorities supervise other providers. What changes is the pace. Where the Commission opens proceedings within its exclusive competence, it must communicate preliminary findings within 30 days and endeavors to adopt a final decision within 90 days.

III. Where the KIDS Act meets other rules

  • GDPR – Age assurance, parental accounts and the review of existing accounts all involve processing personal data of children, who merit specific protection under the GDPR. The KIDS Act does not displace the GDPR. Both must be complied with at once, and data protection authorities will remain competent for the data side of these obligations.
  • AI Act – The rule against AI companions fostering emotional dependency sits alongside the AI Act’s prohibition on AI systems that exploit vulnerabilities due to age (Article 5(1)(b)). Providers of chatbots used by minors will need to assess both.
  • Consumer law and audiovisual rules – The ban on design features that encourage compulsive use overlaps with the Commission’s upcoming Digital Fairness Act on dark patterns and addictive design, and video sharing platforms remain subject to the Audiovisual Media Services Directive.
  • National initiatives – The proposal also responds to a broader trend. Several member states, including Italy, France, Greece, Austria, Poland and Belgium, have notified draft laws restricting minors’ access to certain digital services, with age limits ranging from 13 to 16, and others, such as Spain with its draft Constitutional Law (Ley orgánica) on the protection of minors in digital environments, are moving in the same direction. The KIDS Act is expressly designed to replace these diverging national age limits with a single EU age, leaving room only for higher national minimum ages for specific content such as pornography or gambling. How pending national initiatives fit with the final text is likely to be one of the key questions for providers active across several member states.

IV. Next steps, and where the rule is heading

The proposal has been sent to national parliaments and now awaits the opinions of the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. From there follows the ordinary legislative procedure: the European Parliament and the European Council each work out their own position, before negotiating a final version with the Commission. The text sets no date for when that process will conclude, so anything beyond this point is speculation, not fact.

Even before that negotiation begins, the direction of the proposal is clear. The Commission has chosen to turn what used to be guidance into binding, audited obligations, paired with an expedited enforcement procedure (preliminary findings within 30 days, a final decision targeted within 90 days) and built in review points from the outset. Whatever changes during negotiation, that underlying model (hard rules, independent audits and a faster enforcement clock) is unlikely to be negotiated away entirely. In practical terms, we suggest that affected companies:

  • Map the services and features in scope (account creation, notifications, recommender systems and chatbots) against the proposal
  • Run a gap analysis against Article 28 DSA and the Commission’s guidelines, since KIDS Act compliance will not cover everything
  • Choose an age assurance solution and carry out the corresponding data protection impact assessment
  • Assign ownership of the risk within product teams, with clear governance and reporting lines
  • Consider engaging in the legislative process, through industry associations, the European Parliament rapporteurs or the member states’ permanent representations in Council

The proposal is at an early stage of the ordinary legislative procedure. The obligations described in this article reflect the text submitted by the Commission on September 17, 2026, and may change during negotiation.

A view from outside the EU: Colombia

The questions the KIDS Act tries to answer (at what age children should access social media, who verifies that age and how and how much of the burden falls on product design) are not unique to Europe. Legislators elsewhere are dealing with the same issues, often with different tools. Colombia offers a useful point of comparison.

The Colombian perspective

Colombia offers an interesting point of comparison because it is also incorporating the protection of minors into the design and operation of digital services. Law 2489 of 2025, regulated through Decree 769 of 2026, operates alongside the personal data protection regime established by Law 1581 of 2012. The framework covers telecommunications networks and services, digital platforms, applications, video games and AI systems accessible to minors in Colombia. A company should therefore assess its exposure even if its product is not deliberately aimed at children and adolescents. The applicable obligations vary depending on the service, the risk involved and the provider’s ability to address it. There are also specific exclusions for providers of content subject to editorial control.

For companies operating outside Colombia, it is necessary to examine the connection between their activities and the country. Law 1581 applies to personal data processing in Colombia and, in certain circumstances, to controllers and processors established abroad. There have been instances where the Colombian data protection authority (the Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio, or SIC) has asserted jurisdiction upon foreign entities. The mere accessibility of a service from Colombia however does not automatically make all obligations under local law applicable.

Companies should distinguish between access to a service, authorization to process personal data and age verification. Processing minors’ data must serve their best interests and respect their fundamental rights; parental consent does not suffice for all forms of processing. Age verification must be proportionate to risk and comply with data minimization. Decree 769 provides for privacy and security by design and by default, adaptable parental controls and features aimed at preventing compulsive use. In line with SIC rules, where AI involves personal data processing, risk management and privacy impact assessments are warranted.

Oversight is shared among authorities, including the Ministry of Information and Communication Technologies (Ministry of ICT) and the SIC, and breaches can lead to fines. For companies adapting their products to the European framework, this work offers an opportunity to review their operations in Colombia as well.

The Colombian perspective was contributed by Juan Nicolás Laverde, founder of Astra Legal, a Bogotá-based boutique advising on legal and regulatory matters across telecoms, media and tech. Its practice includes commercial and tech advisory, regulatory compliance and strategy and market entry and expansion, including matters involving connectivity, satellite services and digital platforms.

Disclaimer: While every effort has been made to ensure that the information contained in this article is accurate, neither its authors nor Squire Patton Boggs accepts responsibility for any errors or omissions. The content of this article is for general information only, and is not intended to constitute or be relied upon as legal advice.

Since TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, a reliable defense playbook in data privacy class actions has been to recast the plaintiff’s injury as a speculative future risk: no identity theft, no fraud, no out-of-pocket loss, and so no standing. In a published opinion issued October 9, 2026, the Ninth Circuit offered plaintiffs a different route. In Black v. IEC Group, Inc., No. 25-5952 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 2026), a unanimous panel held that health plan participants who alleged that their claims administrator disclosed sensitive health information it had promised to keep confidential suffered a concrete injury in fact, with no need for a further showing of misuse or future harm. The decision makes alleged breach of confidence claims central to standing in Ninth Circuit privacy litigation. It also openly disagrees with how the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have approached the same analogues.

Although Black arose from a misdirected email containing health information, its reasoning according to the plaintiffs’ bar may reach well beyond traditional data breach litigation. Because the court located the injury in the disclosure itself, plaintiffs are likely to invoke the same breach of confidence theory in website tracking cases involving pixels, cookies, and similar technologies, and in other cases where a company allegedly shared information it promised to keep confidential, whether by accident or by design. The historical authorities the panel relied on were not limited to any one category of information. As the Ninth Circuit noted last month and as Joseph Story put it in 1839, “it matters not whether the secrets be secrets of trade, or secrets of title, or other secrets of the party important to his interests.”

Read on to learn more.

I.       Relevant Background

In Black, the plaintiffs receive health insurance through a plan administered by IEC Group, Inc. (d/b/a AmeriBen). In August 2023, AmeriBen notified them that an associate had emailed a spreadsheet containing their sensitive health information to “one or more [plan] members.” The information that “may have been disclosed” included names, unique tracking numbers, provider names, claim numbers, dates of service, and the amounts billed or paid. The plaintiffs alleged that AmeriBen “expressly and impliedly promised, including through its Privacy Policy, to keep their information confidential and not to disclose it without consent.” They brought eight state-law claims, including negligence, breach of contract, breach of implied contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and a claim under Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.

The District of Idaho granted AmeriBen’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Relying on an unpublished Ninth Circuit disposition, the court held that a plaintiff alleging disclosure of personal information must show that “the nature of the information disclosed, the context of the disclosure, and other alleged injuries associated with the disclosure demonstrate an imminent and substantial injury.” It found that the plaintiffs had not shown a substantial likelihood of future injury.

II. The Ninth Circuit’s Holding: Breach of Confidence as the Historical Analogue

Assessing the case on appeal, Judge Tung opened the opinion with: “If you entrust a company to keep your sensitive health information private, but the company then discloses that information to others without your consent, have you been injured? We hold yes.”

The panel applied the Spokeo and TransUnion framework, which asks whether an intangible harm has a “close historical or common-law analogue” in harms traditionally recognized as a basis for suit in English or American courts. It found that analogue in the action for breach of confidence. Under that action, a defendant is liable for “the unconsented, unprivileged disclosure to a third party of nonpublic information that the defendant has learned within a confidential relationship.”

Much of the opinion traces the history of that action. Coke’s Institutes named “breach of confidence” as one of the three classic grounds of equity jurisdiction. The panel then followed the doctrine through a line of Chancery decisions from 1758, including a line of more recent decisions from American courts standing for the proposition that: “a trust betrayed is the harm.” On this view, adopted by the Ninth Circuit, the injury lies in the abuse of the confidential relationship itself, separate from any property interest or economic loss.

The panel acknowledged that the modern privacy tort has largely eclipsed breach of confidence, though breach of confidence “appears more recently to have made a comeback.” In the view of the Court, this was a distinction without a difference as breach of confidence supported a suit in English and American courts, and that history is enough to make it a close analogue under TransUnion.

The court drew on two further sources of support for its ruling. The first was breach of contract. A relationship of confidence is often formed by contract, and actions for breach of contract were available at common law even without pecuniary or physical injury. The second was congressional judgment. HIPAA creates no private right of action, but it prohibits disclosure of individually identifiable health information and in some circumstances makes knowing disclosure a crime. In the panel’s view, Congress decided that even “mundane” data such as provider names, dates of service, and amounts billed deserve statutory protection. The court gave examples of why: such information could reveal daily psychiatric treatment or fertility care.

Finally, the panel addressed the rule that standing is not “dispensed in gross.” It explained that injury in fact “turns on the harm a plaintiff has suffered rather than the legal theory he invokes,” so where every count rests on the same injury, the inquiry “yields a single answer.”

III. A Widening Circuit Divide

In a footnote, the Ninth Circuit described out-of-circuit decisions holding otherwise as “readily distinguishable” because none involved “a breach of confidentiality grounded in contractual promises to keep sensitive HIPAA-protected health information private.” Regardless, footnotes 2 and 3 of the opinion show clear disagreement with other circuits on two fronts.

Breach of confidence and nominal-damages contract claims. In footnote 3, the panel noted that the Third Circuit, “hesitate[d] to conclude” that breach of confidence was traditionally recognized as a basis for suit. The Ninth Circuit rejected that hesitation. It reasoned that nominal damages in a breach of contract case are “a historical recognition that a party is harmed by the very act of the breach itself,” much like a trespasser who sets “merely one foot” on another’s land.

Disclosure of private information and the “publicity” element. In footnote 2, the panel observed that sister circuits—with the Eleventh, Tenth, Seventh, Third and Fourth Circuits on one side, and the D.C. , Second, and Sixth Circuits on the other—“have apparently adopted different approaches” on whether a plaintiff relying on a disclosure-of-private-information theory must allege the tort’s “publicity” element. The panel expressly declined to decide whether disclosure of private information, standing alone, would also confer standing.

IV. Conclusion

The practical significance of Black is that in privacy litigations in the Ninth Circuit, Plaintiffs will likely argue they no longer need to plead facts showing that identity theft or fraud is imminent. Instead, they may assert they can allege for purposes of Article III standing that they entrusted nonpublic information to the defendant within a confidential relationship, that the defendant promised to keep it confidential, and that the defendant disclosed it without consent.

The Court’s holding is distinguishable, as it was dependent on the circumstances of the case presented. Cases without those features, especially those involving disclosures by parties with no relationship of trust with the plaintiff, and others, should be easier to distinguish.

Because the Ninth Circuit includes California, where much of the nation’s privacy class action litigation is filed, Black is likely to be cited widely in motions to dismiss on standing grounds. With the circuits divided on breach of confidence, nominal-damages contract claims, and the publicity element, the question of what counts as a concrete privacy injury after TransUnion may well return to the Supreme Court.

Privacy World will continue to monitor related developments. Stay tuned.

I. Introduction

Earlier this year, the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) published Mass Arbitration in Transition: What 2025 Data Reveals About a Shifting Landscape. This is the AAA’s second annual look at the mass arbitrations filed on its docket. At first glance, the headline number looks like good news for businesses: the AAA received approximately 280,000 individual mass arbitration demands in 2024, but just under 105,000 in 2025. Read more closely, however, the data tells a different story. The number of distinct mass arbitration campaigns held essentially steady (88 in 2025 compared to 92 in 2024), and the AAA has seen close to 250 unique mass arbitrations since 2023 alone. Thus, plaintiffs’ firms are not filing fewer campaigns; they are filing campaigns of different sizes, in different industries, and on evolving legal theories.

At bottom: mass arbitration filing activity remains high heading into the end of 2026, and SPB expects filings to continue at elevated levels throughout 2027. Below, we summarize the key figures from the AAA’s report, get behind the data, and offer practical steps for companies with consumer-facing arbitration agreements. Read on to learn more.

II.  Mass Arbitration Overview

For several decades, it has been common practice for businesses to include arbitration provisions with class action waivers in their consumer and employment agreements. This arrangement provided assurance that the business would not face the abuses of the class action procedure: a plaintiffs’ lawyer finding one plaintiff and threatening massive liability without individualized determinations on the merits. Instead, bolstered by the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, which struck down a California law prohibiting class action waivers in consumer contracts, a business could compel any disputes to be heard on a one-on-one basis before an arbitral body.

The most frequently used arbitral bodies—the AAA and JAMS—use a similar fee structure for consumer and employment cases. Critically, under the rules of both organizations, a consumer or employee filing a case does not pay all of the initial filing fee: the business must bear the bulk of the filing fee, which may be a couple thousand dollars per case. This filing fee is incurred before any arbitrator decides the merits of the case. Arbitrator appointments and other case administration beyond filing also incur per-case fees.

Without the benefit of the class action procedure, plaintiffs’ lawyers since Concepcion have used another means to create an outsized liability threat: filing hundreds or thousands of arbitration claims against the same business. In these “mass arbitrations,” the business may be on the hook for millions of dollars in arbitration filing fees regardless of the merits of the claims being asserted. Moreover, the plaintiffs’ lawyer will point to the arbitration provision drafted by the business as prohibiting a class action or other consolidation method that could limit the number of cases being litigated and the fees incurred.

This mass arbitration technique first appeared in 2018 and 2019 in the context of wage-and-hour claims, where plaintiffs’ firms could recruit employees and contractors of companies via online advertising and enrollment. Post-COVID, mass arbitrations have expanded to other claims, in particular many consumer privacy and data breach statutes such as the Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”), the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”), and Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”). These federal and state privacy laws are particularly appealing to plaintiffs’ lawyers for mass arbitrations because they often (i) have a private right of action, (ii) provide for statutory liquidated damages without the need to prove actual damages, and (iii) may be plausibly asserted against common consumer-business interactions—like website visits, mobile app downloads, or data processing—that are identical for thousands of recruitable claimants.

In the face of these mass arbitrations, JAMS and the AAA have started to issue rules specific to mass arbitrations, defined to mean arbitrations involving more than a certain number of demands against one respondent filed by the same law firm or coordinating law firms. However, the nature of the underlying fee structure has meant that plaintiffs’ firms can still generate massive leverage against businesses by filing a mass arbitration, regardless of the merits.

III.  Breakdown of the AAA’s Recent Mass Arbitration Statistics

Mass arbitration, as the AAA defines it, involves 25 or more similar demands filed against a common entity where representation on each side is consistent or coordinated (the threshold is 100 cases for non-consumer, non-employment matters). Key recent AAA data points include:

  • AAA Consumer Filings: 104,556 new consumer demands across 81 unique mass arbitration caseloads.
  • Top Consumer Industries: Entertainment/Gaming (42,299 demands), Retail (32,203), Financial Services (8,584), Hospitality/Travel (8,527), and Telecommunications (5,978).
  • Awards Remain Rare: Fewer than 1% of consumer mass arbitration cases reaching the merits phase were decided by award, compared to roughly 14% of individual (non-mass) consumer arbitrations.
  • California Dominates: California was the top locale for both consumer and employment merits caseloads, accounting for 3,345 of the consumer merits cases.

As the AAA itself stresses, “[v]olatility has defined the marketplace, with data fluctuating wildly year-to-year as large mass arbitrations create equally large shifts in numbers.” https://www.adr.org/news-and-insights/what-2025-data-reveals-about-mass-arbitration/. The data published this year by the AAA bears that out. The drop in employment demands is almost entirely attributable to one mass arbitration of about 30,000 cases filed in 2024 that had no counterpart in 2025. On the consumer side, the Gaming/Entertainment mass arbitration category remained the largest source of new demands but saw about 59,000 fewer demands than in 2024. In other words, the decline in the number of cases filed with the AAA reflects fewer mega-filings, not fewer mass arbitration campaigns.

At the same time, the targets are shifting. Retail was not a top sector in 2024 but generated more than 32,000 new demands in 2025, and the Hospitality/Travel category likewise emerged with more than 8,500 new consumer demands. Technology, which had more than 50,000 demands in 2024, did not make the 2025 list at all. The AAA concludes that these shifts reflect the wide variety of claims that can be brought in mass arbitration—a conclusion also consistent with SPB’s experience in this space.

IV.  Mass Arbitration Predictions Heading into the End of 2026 and the Start of 2027

Based on the AAA’s recent analysis and trends observed in 2026, SPB anticipates that mass arbitration filing activity will remain high through 2027, for several reasons.

  • The economics of mass arbitration still favor claimants’ counsel at the demand stage. The AAA’s recent settlement data confirms that the core features of mass arbitration remain consistent: for many defendants, high settlement rates and early resolution before merits arbitrators are appointed. Even under the AAA’s revised fee structure, consumers pay a flat $3,125 fee at filing regardless of how many cases are filed, while the business bears the larger share of fees. See, e.g., https://www.privacyworld.blog/2024/03/updates-to-mass-arbitration-rules-scope-and-anticipated-impact/. As long as the cost of defending thousands of individual claims exceeds the cost of a global settlement, the incentive to file will persist.
  • The plaintiffs’ bar continues to adapt the privacy theories underlying many mass arbitrations as the legal landscape evolves. Consumer privacy and data breach statutes such as the VPPA, CIPA, and BIPA have become staples of mass arbitration, as we discussed in our 2025 Mass Arbitration Year in Review.  Plaintiffs’ firms have filed thousands of class actions and mass arbitration demands against operators of consumer-facing websites and apps targeting tools such as advertising pixels. As CIPA’s most popular theories are narrowed by the courts and by the California Legislature’s passage of SB 690 in August 2026, the same firms are increasingly pairing or replacing CIPA counts with claims under the federal Wiretap Act, the VPPA, and out-of-state wiretap laws led by Florida’s Security of Communications Act (“FSCA”). Separately, on January 26, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case presenting a circuit split over who counts as a “consumer” under the VPPA, with a decision expected by mid-2027. A broad ruling could support expanded filings of VPPA claims, in court and in arbitration, during 2027.
  • Many companies’ arbitration programs are in flux, given uncertainty in the case law and in the filing landscape before the AAA, JAMS, and other arbitration providers. The AAA reports that commentators predict a “fork in the road,” whereby “[s]ome businesses may amend their clauses to allow class actions, either in arbitration or in court, while other businesses may continue to use arbitration, including mass arbitrations, and decide to try cases to award.”  https://www.adr.org/news-and-insights/what-2025-data-reveals-about-mass-arbitration/.

V.  Conclusion

With these trends in mind, companies looking to mitigate their mass arbitration risk heading into the end of 2026 should consider the following points:

  • Revisit your arbitration agreement now. The AAA reports that it is seeing more detailed clauses that set out specific mass arbitration procedures, pre-conditions to filing, and expanded authority for Process Arbitrators. Companies whose consumer arbitration agreements do not address these procedures should assess whether updates are warranted.
  • Audit tracking technologies. Because privacy statutes continue to supply the legal theories behind many campaigns, companies should review their use of pixels, session replay, embedded video, and similar tools, along with their consent mechanisms.
  • Plan for California. With California serving as the dominant locale for merits caseloads, California-specific exposure should be a central part of any mass arbitration risk assessment.

As the AAA puts it, mass arbitration remains a “young field ripe for development.” https://www.adr.org/news-and-insights/what-2025-data-reveals-about-mass-arbitration/. The AAA’s statistics show a marketplace that is changing shape, not shrinking.

With privacy theories migrating to new statutes, a VPPA decision from the Supreme Court on the horizon, and mass arbitration expanding into new consumer sectors, SPB expects filings to remain high through the remainder of 2026 and into 2027. SPB’s Data Disputes team will continue to monitor these developments, so stay tuned to Privacy World for further updates.

On Friday the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit revived a putative privacy class action alleging that an optical retailer disclosed customers’ health-related website activity to Meta Platforms, Inc. through the Meta Pixel without their knowledge or consent.

In its October 23, 2026, published decision in Rand v. Eyemart Express, L.L.C., the court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing, that their browsing, purchasing, and appointment-scheduling activity plausibly constituted individually identifiable health information (“IIHI”), and that they plausibly alleged Eyemart shared that information with Meta. The court reversed the dismissal of the case and remanded it for further proceedings.

Although the decision arose at the pleading stage and does not resolve the ultimate merits, it may significantly affect litigation involving tracking technologies on websites offering health-related products or services, and it expands the case law relied upon by the plaintiffs’ bar in bringing these cases.

The Allegations Against Eyemart

Eyemart operates physical stores and a website through which customers may browse eyewear, purchase prescription glasses, and schedule eye examinations. According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, Eyemart installed the Meta Pixel on its website, allowing information about users’ searches, clicks, product views, purchases, and appointment-scheduling activity to be transmitted to Meta.

The plaintiffs were Facebook users and alleged that Meta could combine information collected from Eyemart’s website with identifying information associated with their Facebook accounts. They contended that this allowed Meta to associate particular users with their health-related website activity and use that information for targeted advertising. They also alleged that Eyemart uploaded customer lists to Meta, including email addresses and the prescription eyewear customers purchased or viewed, so that Meta could match users to their Facebook profiles.

The plaintiffs asserted claims under the federal Wiretap Act, the Missouri Wiretap Act, the Illinois Eavesdropping Act, and common-law claims for intrusion upon seclusion and breach of contract. They did not bring a claim directly under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), which does not provide a private right of action. Instead, they relied in part on HIPAA’s statutory definition of IIHI to characterize the information allegedly transmitted.

The district court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. It concluded that plaintiffs who browsed and searched for prescription eyewear, one of whom also scheduled an eye examination, had not adequately alleged that they provided health information to Eyemart. It also determined that plaintiffs who entered prescription information had failed to plausibly allege that their health information was transmitted to Meta. The Fifth Circuit rejected both conclusions.

Unauthorized Disclosure of Health Information Can Establish Article III Standing

The Fifth Circuit first held, agreeing with the district court, that the plaintiffs adequately alleged a concrete and particularized injury sufficient to establish Article III standing.

The court reasoned that the alleged unauthorized disclosure of private health information was sufficiently analogous to harms traditionally addressed by the common-law torts of intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts. A plaintiff does not need to establish every element of a comparable common-law tort to demonstrate standing. Instead, the alleged harm must be similar in kind to a harm traditionally recognized by the common law.

In reaching that conclusion, the Fifth Circuit joined other federal appellate courts that have recognized standing based on the alleged unauthorized disclosure of identifiable online viewing, browsing, or purchasing activity. The court noted that those cases involved media-consumption and shopping data, and concluded that analogies drawn in one of them—the D.C. Circuit’s 2025 decision in Pileggi v. Washington Newspaper Publishing Co., which likened Pixel tracking to a magazine seller nosing through someone’s mailbox—apply “with even more force” to personal health information.

Standing has been a recurring threshold issue in website-tracking and digital privacy litigation following the Supreme Court’s decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez. Under Rand, an alleged disclosure of identifiable health-related activity to a third party may itself be sufficient to establish a concrete injury, even if the plaintiff does not allege identity theft or financial loss.

The decision does not, however, establish that Eyemart violated any of the laws asserted in the complaint. On remand, the district court must address whether the plaintiffs have adequately pleaded the remaining elements of their claims.

Browsing Activity May Qualify as Health Information

The court’s treatment of browsing and appointment-scheduling activity may be particularly consequential for companies using online tracking technologies.
The plaintiffs fell into two groups:

  • “Search Plaintiffs,” who allegedly browsed and searched for prescription eyewear, one of whom also used the website to schedule an eye examination; and
  • “Prescription Plaintiffs,” who allegedly purchased prescription eyewear and entered prescription-related information.

The Fifth Circuit held that the Search Plaintiffs plausibly alleged the disclosure of IIHI even though they had not necessarily entered a diagnosis, symptom, or prescription. The court explained that IIHI is not limited to information revealing a specific medical condition. Under HIPAA’s definition, information may qualify if it is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer, or health care clearinghouse; relates to an individual’s health, the provision of health care, or payment for health care; and identifies the individual or reasonably can be used to do so.

Because Eyemart allegedly provided health-related products and services, the court concluded at the pleading stage that activity involving prescription eyewear and eye-examination scheduling could relate to an individual’s health or the provision of health care. Because Meta allegedly could associate that activity with particular Facebook users, the information was plausibly identifiable.

The court distinguished American Hospital Ass’n v. Becerra, a 2024 Northern District of Texas decision that invalidated Department of Health and Human Services guidance treating an IP address combined with a visit to a health-related webpage as IIHI. Becerra involved only an IP address linked to a website visit, whereas the plaintiffs here alleged that a third party received detailed information about specific products or services and could connect that activity to an existing user profile. That distinction suggests that courts may evaluate the complete alleged data flow, rather than assessing individual data elements in isolation.

The Fifth Circuit also held that the district court had evaluated the Prescription Plaintiffs’ allegations too narrowly. The district court focused on a demonstrative screenshot included in the complaint, even though the screenshot showed only an example of data allegedly transmitted through one website function and did not depict the plaintiffs’ actual transactions. The Fifth Circuit instead considered the complaint as a whole, including allegations that the Meta Pixel operated across Eyemart’s website and transmitted information about products, purchases, and attempts to schedule eye examinations.

What the Decision Means for Businesses Using Tracking Technologies

The decision may have implications beyond optical retailers. Companies offering health-related products or services through websites, mobile applications, or online scheduling tools may face increased litigation risk when using advertising pixels, analytics software, session-replay tools, or similar technologies.
Businesses should consider evaluating:

  • What information their websites and applications transmit to third parties;
  • Whether browsing, purchasing, or scheduling activity may reveal interactions with health-related products or services;
  • Whether a third party can associate transmitted information with an existing user account or profile;
  • Whether cookie banners, consent mechanisms, and privacy notices accurately describe actual data practices; and
  • Whether tracking should be disabled or limited on pages involving sensitive products, services, or transactions.

A technical review should consider the complete data flow, including page URLs, event names, product identifiers, customer lists, account identifiers, and the recipient’s ability to combine those elements.

Conclusion

Rand v. Eyemart Express does not establish that every interaction with a health-related website constitutes IIHI or that every use of the Meta Pixel violates privacy law. The decision is nevertheless significant because it revives claims based on allegations that browsing, purchasing, and appointment-scheduling activity was health-related, identifiable, and transmitted to Meta without consent.

Companies offering health-related products or services should not assess website-tracking risk solely by asking whether they transmit diagnoses, prescriptions, or medical records. After Rand, the broader question may be whether the complete data flow reveals an identifiable individual’s interaction with health-related products or services. Businesses using tracking technologies in these contexts should consider working with experienced privacy counsel to evaluate their data flows, disclosures, consent practices, and potential litigation exposure.

For more, stay tuned.  Privacy World is there to keep you in the loop.

Following the UK Information Commission’s (ICO) call for evidence on 8 October 2026 on the application of existing UK data protection laws to “agentic AI” systems, David Naylor, Simon Jones and Paul Jinks share headline thoughts on some of the fundamental data privacy questions raised by the use of agentic AI, summarise the key elements of the ICO’s call for evidence and outline who should respond and why. Read more here.

This article appeared first on the Global IP & Technology Law Blog.

Disclaimer: While every effort has been made to ensure that the information contained in this article is accurate, neither its authors nor Squire Patton Boggs accepts responsibility for any errors or omissions. The content of this article is for general information only, and is not intended to constitute or be relied upon as legal advice.